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MIDLAND FUNDING V. JOHNSON  
AND THE PERNICIOUS PROBLEM OF 
 STALE-DEBT CLAIMS 
Kara J. Bruce* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson1 represents the culmination of 
a nationwide litigation blitz to combat the filing of “stale-debt claims” 
in consumer bankruptcy cases. Debt buyers, who purchase portfolios 
of old debt for pennies on the dollar, have filed massive numbers of 
proofs of claim in consumer bankruptcy cases to collect debts for 
which the statute of limitations has run. This practice is predicated on 
the expectation that the bankruptcy system will fail to screen out all 
time-barred debts, and as a result, that some of these stale-debt claims 
will receive payment in a debtor’s bankruptcy case. Because the 
Bankruptcy Code and Rules provide no clear remedy for deterring this 
practice, debtors’ attorneys recently turned to the private remedies 
available under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA” or 
the “Act”).2 They argued that filing a stale-debt claim is false, 
deceptive, or misleading because it misrepresents the enforceability of 
the debt, or that the practice is an unfair or unconscionable use of the 
bankruptcy process.3 
In Midland Funding, the Supreme Court held in a 5-3 decision 
that filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt, without more, does 
not violate the FDCPA. This holding leaves bankruptcy professionals 
to reckon with the gaps in bankruptcy’s existing remedial structure as 
 
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, University 
of Toledo College of Law. My thanks to Alexandra Sickler, Chris Bradley, Melissa Jacoby, Bob 
Lawless, and the participants at the Young Bankruptcy Scholars’ Workshop at Brooklyn Law 
School for refining my thinking on this topic. Breanne Hitchen provided helpful research 
assistance. 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017). 
 2. See Kara J. Bruce, Debt Buyers Beware: Filing Proofs of Claim for Time-Barred Debt in 
the Eleventh Circuit and Beyond, BANKR. L. LTR., June 2016, at 5. 
 3. See id. 
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they seek to address the massive numbers of time-barred debt claims 
that pass through the bankruptcy process. While Midland Funding 
does not foreclose the FDCPA’s application to bankruptcy altogether, 
the Court’s sweeping language, together with its decision in a related 
FDCPA case,4 might sharply limit the FDCPA’s utility in the future. 
This Comment considers Midland Funding’s effect on the 
bankruptcy system’s ability to police stale-debt claims. It begins by 
explaining how the practice of filing time-barred debt claims takes 
advantage of gaps in bankruptcy’s enforcement structure. It then 
describes the rash of FDCPA lawsuits leading up to Midland Funding, 
as well as the majority and dissenting opinions in Midland Funding. 
Finally, this Comment considers some analytical deficiencies in the 
majority’s opinion and briefly outlines several actual or anticipated 
effects of the ruling. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF TIME-BARRED DEBT CLAIMS 
Over the last decade or more, debt buyers have used the 
bankruptcy system to seek payment of old, often time-barred debt 
from consumers.5 Although the expiration of a statute of limitations 
provides a complete defense to the collectability of stale debts, debt 
collectors apparently rely on the expectation that a percentage of these 
claims will pass through the bankruptcy process without notice, and 
will therefore receive some amount of distribution or plan payments 
from a debtor’s bankruptcy case.6 This section explains the structural 
realities of the bankruptcy process that make this practice a profitable 
one. It then describes how debtors have brought suit under the FDCPA 
to combat the practice, generating the case law leading up to Midland 
Funding. 
A.  Collecting Debt in Bankruptcy: The Proof-of-Claim Process 
A creditor of a debtor in bankruptcy has a “claim” against the 
bankruptcy estate for the amount the debtor owes.7 If a creditor wishes 
 
 4. See infra Part IV (discussing Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 
(2017)). 
 5. See Bruce, supra note 2, at 1 for a discussion of this phenomenon. 
 6. See id. at 3. 
 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012) (defining “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not 
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured” or a “right to an equitable remedy for 
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment”). 
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to receive a share of any distributions from a debtor’s bankruptcy case, 
the creditor typically files a “proof of claim”8 as evidence of the 
character and amount of the claim.9 To the extent that a claim is 
“allowed” in the bankruptcy case, it will receive a distribution of any 
available assets or plan payments.10 
Section 502(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the allowance 
of claims. It provides that a claim shall be allowed “except to the 
extent that . . . such claim is unenforceable . . . under any agreement 
or applicable law.”11 Claims that are subject to a statute-of-limitations 
defense are unenforceable under applicable law and are thus subject 
to disallowance. Yet proofs of claim are entitled to prima facie 
validity.12 As such, if no party files an objection, claims are “deemed 
allowed” and eventually receive a pro-rata share of any distribution 
from the debtor’s estate.13 
In addition to the prima facie validity of claims, economic 
realities facilitate the collection of time-barred debts in consumer 
bankruptcy cases. Debt buyers, who are primarily responsible for 
filing stale-debt claims, typically buy massive amounts of old debt for 
pennies on the dollar. According to the Federal Trade Commission, 
debt buyers can pay as little as two cents on the dollar for debts older 
than six years, and “effectively nothing” for debts greater than fifteen 
years old.14 Likewise, filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy is a 
relatively inexpensive undertaking; no filing fee is required, and 
creditors can complete and electronically submit a simple PDF form.15 
 
 8. A proof of claim is a simple legal document, signed under penalty of perjury, which sets 
forth a creditor’s claim. It typically includes copies of supporting documentation to establish the 
basis of the claim. See OFFICIAL FORM 410, PROOF OF CLAIM, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites 
/default/files/form_b410.pdf; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001. 
 9. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 501.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2017). 
 10. Id. at ¶ 502.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2017). In a chapter 7 
case, creditors are satisfied primarily through the liquidation of a debtor’s property. The chapter 7 
trustee seizes and sells certain property of the debtor and distributes the proceeds to claims 
according to the bankruptcy’s priority structure. In a chapter 13 case, debtors form a plan to pay 
creditors a portion of their income over time. The chapter 13 trustee distributes these “plan 
payments” on behalf of creditors. 
 11. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2012). 
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(f). 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). 
 14. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING 
INDUSTRY 23–24 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-and-
practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf. 
 15. See OFFICIAL FORM 410, PROOF OF CLAIM, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
form_b410.pdf; Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fees Schedule, U.S. CTS., 
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Given the low cost of purchasing and filing stale-debt claims, it is easy 
to see how debt buyers might profit if only a very small portion of 
time-barred debts are deemed allowed.16 
Conversely, the parties who are best positioned to review and 
object to claims—the chapter 7 or 13 trustee, the debtor, or another 
creditor—face a number of impediments to actually completing the 
task. First, a trustee is appointed in every consumer bankruptcy case 
and is charged with the duty to “examine proofs of claims and object 
to the allowance of any claim that is improper” if a purpose would be 
served by doing so.17 Yet chapter 7 and 13 trustees often carry massive 
caseloads and have a variety of statutory duties in addition to the 
monitoring of claims.18 What is more, determining whether a debt is 
time-barred often requires the trustee to investigate choice of law, 
tolling, and revival—information to which the trustee might not have 
ready access.19 Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that trustees will catch 
all of the problematic claims that debt buyers file.20 Moreover, 
expecting trustees’ offices to undertake a more robust and time-
intensive claim review might increase the costs of administrating 
bankruptcy cases, and such costs ultimately would be passed along to 
creditors who have complied with bankruptcy law and procedure. 
Debtors have better information about the origin and status of the 
debt, but often lack a financial incentive to object to claims because 
the allowance or disallowance of a stale-debt claim will not alter their 
personal outcomes in bankruptcy.21 Indeed, debtors might have strong 
 
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/bankruptcy-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019).  
 16. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Midland Funding, LLC 
v. Johnson, 2016 WL 7422733 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-348). 
 17. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2012); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) (2012). 
 18. See Kara Bruce, Closing Consumer Bankruptcy’s Enforcement Gap, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 
479, 491–92 (2017). 
 19. See Brief for Nat’l Assoc. of Chapter Thirteen Trs. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 2016 WL 7449176 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-348); see 
also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Midland Funding, LLC v. 
Johnson, 2016 WL 7422733 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-348). 
 20. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were amended in 2012 in order to make stale-
debt claims easier to detect. Rule 3001(c)(3) requires the holder of a claim based on an “open-end 
or revolving consumer credit agreement” to disclose certain information relevant to determining 
timeliness. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c)(3). Yet even after these amendments, claims do not include 
all of the information needed to conclusively determine whether the statute of limitations has 
expired. See Brief for Nat’l Assoc. of Chapter Thirteen Trs. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson at 14, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (No. 16-348). 
 21. W. HOMER DRAKE, JR., ET AL., CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 17:3 (2d ed. 
2017) (noting that in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case, “unless the debtor’s plan provides for the 
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disincentives to object to stale-debt claims, insofar as the cost of filing 
an objection might not be included in the debtor’s fee agreement with 
his or her attorney.22 
Finally, although competing creditors might stand to gain a 
greater share of a debtor’s assets or plan payments if the stale-debt 
claim is disallowed, the amounts at issue in a single bankruptcy case 
are typically too small to justify building routine claim review into the 
scope of their creditors’-rights work. Moreover, some courts have 
questioned whether creditors have standing to object to proofs of 
claim.23 
Some debtors’ attorneys responded to this imbalance by 
challenging the filing of stale-debt claims using the FDCPA.24 Debtors 
argued that debt buyers engage in false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, 
or unconscionable conduct when they seek to collect stale debt 
through bankruptcy’s proof-of-claim process.25 These cases sought to 
increase the cost to debt collectors of filing time-barred claims in order 
to provide a more meaningful deterrent than the Bankruptcy Code 
otherwise provides.26 The following sub-parts introduce the FDCPA 
and discuss its application to the pernicious problem of stale-debt 
claims. 
B.  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and 
its Application to Stale-Debt Claims 
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1978 to “eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt 
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are 
not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State 
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”27 The Act 
 
payment of all unsecured claims in full, disallowance of reduction of an unsecured claim may not 
affect how much she pays to complete her plan”). 
 22. Id.; see also Bruce, supra note 18, at 504 (explaining that fee agreements in bankruptcy 
often carve out adversary matters to ensure a low cost of access to bankruptcy). 
 23. Compare, e.g., In re Bozman, 403 B.R. 494, 496 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (holding that a 
creditor may object), with In re Micro-Precision Techs., Inc., 303 B.R. 238, 243 (Bankr. D. N.H. 
2003) (citations omitted) (holding that creditors lack “full and unfettered” standing to object), and 
Eastgate Enters., Inc. v. Funk (In re Meade Land & Dev. Co.), 1 B.R. 279, 279–82 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1979) (holding that creditors generally should channel their objections through the appointed 
trustee to further orderly administration of the estate). 
 24. Bruce, supra note 2, at 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012). 
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prohibits, among other things, debt-collection actions that are “false, 
deceptive, or misleading” and “unfair or unconscionable.”28 It 
provides consumers a private right of action to recover actual 
damages, statutory damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees and 
costs.29 
The FDCPA has long been applied to punish the collection of 
stale debts outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, every federal court of 
appeals to hear the issue has held or suggested that filing or threatening 
suit to collect debts for which the statute of limitations has run violates 
the Act.30 In so holding, courts have highlighted the information 
asymmetry between consumers and debt collectors: consumers may 
not realize their rights have been violated, or may not have the 
fortitude or financial resources to challenge the behavior when it has 
occurred.31 As such, debt collectors engage in false, deceptive, or 
misleading conduct when they threaten or pursue enforcement of stale 
debts.32 
Whether this precedent applies with equal force to the collection 
of debts in bankruptcy is a question that, before Midland Funding, 
divided lower courts.33 Some courts, most notably the Eleventh Circuit 
in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC,34 held that debtors in bankruptcy 
are just as vulnerable to creditor overreaching as debtors who are sued 
in state court, and as such, the FDCPA should likewise bar the 
collection of stale debts through bankruptcy’s proof-of-claim 
process.35 Other courts disagreed, pointing to a variety of procedural 
 
 28. Id. at 1692(e), 1692(f). 
 29. Id. at 1692(k). 
 30. See, e.g., Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2013); Huertas 
v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 
F.3d 779, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting in dicta that “threatening to sue on time-barred debt may well 
constitute a violation of the FDCPA”); Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (suggesting that  filing or threatening suit to collect time-barred debt violates 
the FDCPA, but finding no FDCPA violation in the case at hand because the debt collector never 
took such actions). 
 31. Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 1987). 
 32. Id. at 1488–89. 
 33. See Bruce, supra note 2, at 2. 
 34. 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 35. Id. at 1262; see also Taylor v. Midland Funding, LLC, 94 F. Supp. 3d 941, 948–49 (N.D. 
Ill. 2015); Brimmage v. Quantum3 Grp., LLC (In re Brimmage), 523 B.R. 134, 141 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2015); Grandidier v. Quantum3 Grp., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00138-RLY-TAB, 2014 WL 
6908482, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2014); Reed v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 181 F. Supp. 3d 523, 530 
(N.D. Ill. 2015); Avalos v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Avalos), 531 B.R. 748, 757 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2015); Edwards v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Edwards), 539 B.R. 360, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2015). 
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distinctions that place debtors in a fundamentally different position 
than their state-court counterparts, and therefore holding that the filing 
of a time-barred proof of claim is not false, deceptive, misleading, 
unfair, or unconscionable under the Act.36 
Courts were likewise divided on whether the FDCPA should have 
any application in bankruptcy. Some courts held that the FDCPA 
cannot apply in bankruptcy, as its provisions stand in “irreconcilable 
conflict” with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.37 This issue, 
which is typically characterized as whether the later-enacted 
Bankruptcy Code impliedly repeals the FDCPA, has generated a three-
way circuit split. The Ninth Circuit completely precludes the 
application of the FDCPA to bankruptcy matters, while the Second 
Circuit holds that matters arising before the debtor’s discharge cannot 
support an FDCPA claim.38 Other circuits, including the Third, 
Seventh, and most recently, the Eleventh, have held that FDCPA 
liability can arise in active bankruptcy cases, including in the proof-
of-claim context.39 The following section outlines the facts and 
procedural history of the Eleventh Circuit case, Johnson v. Midland 
Funding, LLC,40 and its continuation to the Supreme Court in Midland 
Funding v. Johnson. 
C.  Midland Funding v. Johnson 
In March 2014, Aleida Johnson filed a petition for relief under 
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Southern District of 
 
 36. See, e.g., Gatewood v. CP Med., LLC (In re Gatewood), 533 B.R. 905, 909 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2015); Broadrick v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Broadrick), 532 B.R. 60, 75 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. 2015); Donaldson v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1040 (S.D. Ind. 2015); 
LaGrone v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re LaGrone), 525 B.R. 419, 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015); 
Torres v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 530 B.R. 268, 276 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Jenkins v. Genesis Fin. Sols. 
(In re Jenkins), 456 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2011); B-Real, LLC v. Rogers, 405 B.R. 428, 
434 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2009). 
 37. See, e.g., Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 528 B.R. 462, 470 (S.D. Ala. 
2015), rev’d, 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. 
Ct. 1407 (2017), vacated, 868 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2017). (“[T]he Code permits creditors to file 
proofs of claim in Chapter 13 proceedings on debts known to be time-barred, while the Act 
prohibits debt collectors from engaging in such conduct. There is thus an obvious tension between 
the Act and the Code.”). 
 38. See Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002); Simmons v. 
Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 39. See Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2004); Simon v. FIA Card Servs., 
N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 279 (3d Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1335 
(11th Cir. 2016). 
 40. 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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Alabama.41 Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland Funding”), a 
commercial debt purchaser, filed a proof of claim in Johnson’s 
bankruptcy case asserting a debt of $1,879.71.42 Johnson had 
originally incurred this debt to Fingerhut Credit Advantage, which at 
some point before the bankruptcy case had sold the debt to Midland 
Funding.43 Midland Funding disclosed on the face of the proof of 
claim that the last payment on the debt had been made, and the account 
had been charged off, more than ten years before the bankruptcy 
filing.44 The applicable statute of limitations for the debt was six 
years.45 
Johnson, through counsel, objected to Midland Funding’s proof 
of claim because it was sought to collect time-barred debt.46 Midland 
Funding did not respond, and the court disallowed the claim.47 The 
debtor then sued Midland Funding in federal district court, arguing 
that filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt was false, deceptive, 
misleading, unfair, and unconscionable under the FDCPA.48 Johnson 
asserted that Midland Funding, like many commercial debt 
purchasers, engaged in a pattern and practice of filing time-barred debt 
claims in bankruptcy cases.49 It alleged that this practice overloaded 
the bankruptcy courts and was an unconscionable use of the 
bankruptcy process.50 
The district court held the FDCPA did not apply to the creditor’s 
filing of a time-barred debt claim because the FDCPA and Bankruptcy 
Code stood in “irreconcilable conflict.”51 The Eleventh Circuit 
reversed, aligning with the Third and Seventh Circuits to hold that the 
FDCPA could apply in bankruptcy.52 The Eleventh Circuit 
underscored that the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code “provid[e] 
 
 41. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411. 
 42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43. Johnson, 823 F.3d at 1336. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 528 B.R. 462, 473 (S.D. Ala. 2015), rev’d, 823 F.3d 
1334 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017), 
vacated, 868 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 52. Id. 
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different tiers of sanctions for creditor misbehavior in bankruptcy.”53 
While the Bankruptcy Code provides for disallowance and perhaps 
sanctions for the filing of improper claims, the FDCPA supplies “an 
additional layer of protection” to consumers when a creditor, which 
qualifies as a “debt collector,” engages in behavior that violates the 
Act.54 The court then applied existing circuit precedent laid out in 
Crawford v. LVNV Funding LLC, and held that the FDCPA could be 
violated if a creditor knowingly filed a proof of claim on a time-barred 
debt.55 
Midland Funding filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of 
two questions: (1) whether filing a proof of claim that accurately 
asserts a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA; and (2) whether the 
Bankruptcy Code precludes the application of the FDCPA to this 
issue.56 The Supreme Court granted the petition and, in May 2017, 
decided Midland Funding v. Johnson.57 
III.  THE COURT’S DECISION 
The Supreme Court held, in a 5-3 decision, that filing a facially 
accurate proof of claim asserting a time-barred debt does not violate 
the FDCPA.58 The majority opinion portrayed consumer bankruptcy 
as containing robust structural protections that easily protect against 
debt-collector misconduct, and depicted debtors in bankruptcy as less 
vulnerable to creditor misconduct than the average consumer.59 
Accordingly, the Court viewed application of the FDCPA in this 
context as unnecessary and procedurally burdensome.60 The dissent 
appeared to describe an entirely different legal system, focusing on 
overworked bankruptcy professionals and a business model that 
exploited structural gaps for profit.61 From this vantage point, the 
 
 53. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017), vacated, 868 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 
2017) 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1342. 
 56. Petition for Writ of Certoriari, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 2016 WL 4983173 at 
*I (Sept. 14, 2016) (No. 16-348), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016). 
 57. Midland Funding, LLC  v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2017). 
 58. Id. at 1411. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the opinion. Id. at 1407. 
 59. See id. at 1414. 
 60. Id. at 1415. 
 61. See id. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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dissent viewed the FDCPA to be central to rebalancing bankruptcy’s 
playing field and deterring abusive claims practices. 
A.  “False, Deceptive, or Misleading” 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, found it 
“reasonably clear” that a facially accurate, but time-barred proof of 
claim is not “false, deceptive or misleading” under section 1692e of 
the FDCPA.62 That the statute of limitations had run, the Court 
explained, did not change the fact that the creditor has the right to 
payment and a “claim” against the debtor’s estate.63 The Court 
underscored that the expiration of the statute of limitations amounts to 
an affirmative defense, and found “nothing misleading or deceptive” 
in the act of filing a proof of claim that is subject to an affirmative 
defense.64 
The Court explained that “to determine whether a statement is 
misleading normally ‘requires consideration of the legal sophistication 
of its audience.’”65 Chapter 13 cases feature a knowledgeable trustee, 
who is charged with the duty to examine proofs of claim. The Court 
concluded that “that trustee is likely to understand that . . . a proof of 
claim is a statement by the creditor that he or she has a right to payment 
subject to disallowance,” and would therefore not be misled by a stale 
claim.66 
B.  “Unfair or Unconscionable” 
Whether filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt is “unfair or 
unconscionable” under section 1692f “present[ed] a closer 
question.”67 The Court noted that several circuit courts have held that 
filing a civil suit to recover a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA, 
because unsophisticated consumers might not realize that the statute 
of limitations could present a defense, the passage of time dulls a 
consumer’s memory and makes it more difficult to defend against a 
collection, and “a consumer might pay a stale debt simply to avoid the 
cost and embarrassment of suit.”68 The Court held, however, that 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1412. 
 65. Id. at 1413. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
[CORRECTED](8)51.2_BRUCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/19  8:45 PM 
2018]MIDLAND FUNDING’S EFFECT ON STALE-DEBT CLAIMS 445 
“[t]hese considerations have significantly diminished force in a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy.”69 
The Court relied on several features of bankruptcy law and 
procedure to support this distinction. First, because consumers 
voluntarily initiate chapter 13 cases, it is less likely that they might 
pay a debt to avoid the cost and embarrassment of suit.70 Second, a 
“knowledgeable trustee is available.”71 Third, “[p]rocedural 
bankruptcy rules more directly guide the evaluation of claims.”72 The 
Court concluded that bankruptcy’s claims resolution process is “‘a 
more streamlined and less unnerving prospect’” than a civil suit to 
collect time-barred debt.73 
The Court was not moved by the evidence of this practice’s 
impact on debtors or the bankruptcy process as a whole.74 It noted that 
stale claims frequently do not affect the debtor’s financial contribution 
to a bankruptcy case, and stated that some debtors might even realize 
benefits when a stale debt discharged in bankruptcy no longer mars 
their credit reports.75 The Court did not comment on the strain the mass 
filing of time-barred debt claims has placed on the bankruptcy 
system.76 It repeatedly expressed concern, however, that FDCPA 
litigation could place additional strains on the court system.77 The 
Court noted that FDCPA claims could result in “added complexity, 
changes in settlement incentives, and a shift from the debtor to the 
creditor the obligation to investigate the staleness of a claim.”78 It 
closed by noting that to apply the FDCPA in the bankruptcy context 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (quoting Gatewood v. CP Med., LLC (In re Gatewood), 533 B.R. 905, 909 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2015)). 
 74. Id. at 1414. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 1410, 1415 (“[A] change in the simple affirmative-defense approach, carving 
out an exception, itself would require defining the boundaries of the exception . . . . To find the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act applicable here would . . . authorize a new significant bankruptcy-
related remedy in the absence of language in the Code providing for it . . . . [I]t would permit 
postbankruptcy litigation in an ordinary civil court concerning a creditor’s state of mind . . . [and] 
it would require creditors . . . to investigate the merits of an affirmative defense (typically the 
debtor’s job to assert and prove).”). 
 78. Id. at 1415. 
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would upset the “delicate balance” of debtor and creditor protections 
created by the Bankruptcy Code and procedural rules.79 
C.  “Everyone with Experience in the Matter” 
The dissent, authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Kagan, began by explaining how debt buyers have built 
a profitable business model on the collection of stale debts, winning 
“billions of dollars in default judgments simply by filing suit and 
betting that consumers will lack the resources to respond.”80 The 
dissent noted that FDCPA claims have “largely beaten back” this 
practice in state courts.81 Now that debt buyers have continued this 
practice in the bankruptcy courts, the dissenting justices found “no 
sound reason” to depart from the precedent that finds that collection 
of time-barred debts violates the FDPCA.82 
The dissent took aim at the majority’s comfort with bankruptcy’s 
structural protections, highlighting how they fail to adequately protect 
against the inadvertent collection of stale debts in bankruptcy.83 The 
dissent took particular issue with the majority’s reliance on the chapter 
13 trustee to police the bankruptcy claims process, noting that 
“everyone with actual experience in the matter insists [the majority’s 
understanding] is false.”84 Trustees carry large caseloads and have 
statutory duties far beyond objecting to stale-debt claims. The dissent 
underscored that they “cannot realistically be expected to identify 
every time-barred . . . claim filed in every bankruptcy.”85 
The dissent also questioned the assertion that a chapter 13 debtor 
is better positioned to respond to misconduct than her non-bankruptcy 
counterpart.86 Someone who has just sought court protection from 
overwhelming debt “is arguably more vulnerable in bankruptcy—not 
less—to the oversights that the debt buyers know will occur.”87 In 
addition, the dissent noted that bankruptcy’s procedural rules do not 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1416–17 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 1417. 
 82. Id. at 1414–18. 
 83. Id. at 1420. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Midland 
Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 2016 WL 7422733 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-348)). 
 86. Id. at 1420–21. 
 87. Id. at 1421. 
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protect against the inadvertent payment of stale-debt claims.88 As to 
the majority’s suggestion that debtors might be better off if these 
claims were disposed of in bankruptcy, the dissent cited several 
counterfactuals to show that this practice might render debtors worse 
off “than had they never entered bankruptcy at all.”89 
Finally, the dissent took pains to underscore that the majority’s 
opinion was reached on narrow grounds and did not need to “be the 
last word on the matter.”90 It looked to Congress to clarify that these 
practices violate the FDCPA.91 
IV.  MIDLAND FUNDING’S TROUBLING LEGACY 
The Court’s opinion in Midland Funding comes from a 
perspective of procedural idealism, and at times seems divorced from 
the day-to-day reality of bankruptcy cases.92 This dissonance 
exacerbates an enforcement gap in bankruptcy’s proof of claim 
process, straining the court’s existing machinery to address stale-debt 
claims. More broadly, the Court’s decision features several sweeping 
statements about the purpose and scope of the FDCPA that, especially 
in conjunction with other recent Court opinions, threaten to drive the 
FDCPA into obsolescence.93 The following subsections address these 
issues. 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. Although not addressed in the dissent, another point worth noting here is that class 
actions are winding their way through the appellate courts based on creditors’ failure to remove 
discharged debts from credit reports. See In re Anderson, 553 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-2496 (2d Cir. July 13, 2016). This case law provides another 
example of the majority’s structural protections failing to match the realities of bankruptcy practice. 
 90. Id. at 1419, 1421. 
 91. Id. at 1421. 
 92. In this respect, Midland Funding hardly stands alone. The bankruptcy literature contains 
many examples of Supreme Court cases that fail to appreciate the realities of bankruptcy practice. 
See Melissa B. Jacoby, Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankruptcy Courts, 87 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 875, 880–81 (2015) (describing the Court’s decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. 
Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010), which imposed a dramatic burden on judges to independently 
review Chapter 13 plans for compliance with bankruptcy law, and noting several other Supreme 
Court cases that impose similar expectations on professionals in the bankruptcy process). 
 93. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1410 (holding “[t]he Act seeks to help consumers by 
preventing consumer bankruptcies in the first place, while the Code creates and maintains the 
‘delicate balance of a debtor’s protections and obligations’”) (quoting Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 
U.S. 642, 651 (1974)). 
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A.  Procedural Ideals and Practical Realities 
One of the most salient aspects of the majority’s opinion is its 
confidence in the structural protections of consumer bankruptcy, and 
particularly in chapter 13 trustees’ capacity to address the problem of 
stale-debt claims. Yet as the briefing made clear and the dissent 
highlights, trustees are inadequately positioned to address time-barred 
debt claims on a widespread basis.94 First, as noted above, many 
trustees manage thousands of cases at a time, and each case can 
include any number of individual proofs of claim. Second, trustees 
typically do not have ready access to information on the applicable 
statute of limitations and whether the statute of limitations has been 
tolled or revived. For these reasons, it is logistically infeasible for 
trustees to subject every filed claim to detailed scrutiny. Moreover, the 
Bankruptcy Code requires the trustee to object to proofs of claim “if a 
purpose would be served” by doing so.95 Although the Code does not 
explain when “a purpose would be served,” this language is generally 
understood to require trustees to object when “other creditors would 
receive a greater distribution if the claims objections were pursued.”96 
Accordingly, trustees could arguably violate their statutory 
obligations if they undertake a review of claims that is more robust 
than the economics of the individual case might justify. To be sure, it 
is difficult to make this calculus in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, where 
most plans contemplate some distribution to unsecured creditors, and 
where the administrative costs are spread across the chapter 13 
system.97 Yet to some extent, the pressure to more fully police claims 
is in tension with the trustee’s fiduciary duties to the estate. 
 
 94. See id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner at 23, Midland Funding, 
LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) (No. 16-348). 
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2012); § 1302(b)(1) (2012). 
 96. Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 176 (2006) (discussing the duty to object in the chapter 7 
context); W. HOMER DRAKE, JR., ET AL., CHAPTER 13: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 13 (2d ed. 
2017) (noting “[a] Chapter 13 trustee is likely to object to a proof of [a] claim when, inter alia, she 
becomes aware that the claim is objectionable and its allowance will dilute the recovery to the 
unsecured claimants”); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1302.03(d) (Richard Levin & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2017) (suggesting a purpose will frequently be served in chapter 13 cases, 
“since substantial distributions are likely to be made to holders of allowed claims”); Thompson v. 
Bronitsky, No. 13-cv-04793-WHO, 2014 WL 2452043, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014) (collecting 
case law supporting the contention that the trustee has the discretion not to object to the claim if 
she finds no purpose would be served). 
 97. See Henry E. Hildebrand III, A Chapter 13 Trustee’s Duty to Object to Claims: An 
Obligation to Bring Fairness to the System, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 40, 40 (2012); Director 
Addresses the 35th Annual Convention of the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees, U.S. 
[CORRECTED](8)51.2_BRUCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/19  8:45 PM 
2018]MIDLAND FUNDING’S EFFECT ON STALE-DEBT CLAIMS 449 
Other aspects of the Court’s opinion are likewise out of touch 
with bankruptcy’s procedural realities. For example, the Court 
expressed concern that FDCPA litigation would cause more 
bankruptcy-related matters to be resolved in ordinary civil courts.98 
This statement does not account for two important factors. First, 
FDCPA claims can be asserted as adversary proceedings, which 
typically are resolved by a bankruptcy judge and within the context of 
the bankruptcy case.99 Second, federal district courts routinely handle 
matters relating to pending and completed bankruptcy cases.100 As the 
dissent notes, “there is nothing new about the inquiry that courts would 
be required to undertake; it is no different than the analyses they 
conduct every day.”101 
The Court also states that a debtor could benefit if a stale claim is 
filed and thereafter discharged.102 Yet payment of a stale-debt claim 
in bankruptcy can revive the statute of limitations, placing a debtor 
whose chapter 13 case does not end with a discharge in a worse 
position.103 More to the point, this statement fails to appreciate that the 
debtor can herself obtain the benefits of a discharge of time-barred 
debt, whether or not the creditor files a claim. The debtor must simply 
list the time-barred debt on her schedules, and if her case is successful 
and no objection is filed, that debt will be permanently discharged.104 
 
DEP’T OF JUST.: JUST. NEWS (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ust/speeches-
testimony/director-addresses-35th-annual-convention-national-association-bankruptcy-trustees 
(suggesting the duty to object to claims is “more clear cut” in chapter 13 cases because “the costs 
of administration are more broadly spread out among perhaps millions of creditors across many 
thousands of cases”). 
 98. See Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1414, 1415 (expressing concern that applying the 
FDCPA in this context would “permit postbankrutpcy litigation in an ordinary civil court” and 
noting that neither the FDCPA nor the Bankruptcy Code provides a “good reason to believe that 
Congress intended an ordinary civil court applying the Act to determine answers to these 
bankruptcy-related questions”). 
 99. For example, the debtor in Crawford brought her claim as an adversary proceeding. See 
Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 100. Kara Bruce, The Debtor Class, 88 TUL. L. REV. 21, 53 (2013) (discussing the frequency 
with which non-bankruptcy courts resolve bankruptcy-related claims and the statutory provisions 
that facilitate such resolution). 
 101. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 n.5 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 1410. 
 103. See id. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that if a chapter 13 case does not 
proceed to a discharge, any payments made on stale debts during bankruptcy will revive the statute 
of limitations). 
 104. Some creditors have argued that listing the debt on the debtor’s schedules revived the debt 
in question. See, e.g., In re Vaughn, 536 B.R. 670, 677 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2015). The author is unaware 
[CORRECTED](8)51.2_BRUCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/19  8:45 PM 
450 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:435 
B.  Policing Bankruptcy Claims 
At oral argument, members of the Court appeared concerned that 
FDCPA claims would duplicate remedies already provided by the 
bankruptcy code and applicable law.105 Yet, the outcome of Midland 
Funding in fact creates a remedial gap.106 Courts have considered and 
rejected several alternative remedies to the problem of stale-debt 
claims. For example, most courts have held that filing a stale-debt 
claim is not sanctionable conduct under Rule 9011 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.107 For similar reasons, courts have rejected arguments that this 
behavior can be sanctioned under the court’s inherent authority or 
section 105 powers.108 Federal and state non-bankruptcy claims for 
vexatious litigation and unfair and deceptive practices have likewise 
failed.109 Without the use of FDCPA liability or an amendment to the 
 
of any cases in which this argument has been successful. See, e.g., id.; Biggs v. Mays, 125 F.2d 
693, 697 (8th Cir. 1942) (citations omitted). 
 105. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. 
Ct. 1407 (2017) (No. 16-348), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/2016/16-348_2cp3.pdf (“We then have the FTC which could do such a thing. We have 
the sanctions in the Bankruptcy Code, and now you want this, too?” (quoting Breyer, J.)). 
 106. Kara J. Bruce and Alex P.E. Sickler, Private Remedies and Access to Justice in a Post-
Midland World, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 369–382 (describing how various efforts to 
address the problem of stale-debt claims in the absence of FDCPA liability have failed). 
 107. Edwards v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Edwards), 539 B.R. 360, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2015) (“[G]iven the split of authority in this circuit and elsewhere . . . there is no basis for 
sanctioning the defendants for filing their proofs of claim in this case in any event.”); In re Freeman, 
540 B.R. 129, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015) (“[G]iven the split in the case law, it is difficult to see 
how sanctions under Rule 9011(b)(2) can be imposed on claimants filing stale proofs of 
claim . . . .”); Casmatta v. Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P. (In re Freeman-Clay), No. 14-20400-
drd13, 2017 WL 3841739, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Sept. 1, 2017) (“[T]he mere filing of a claim 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, even by an entity with knowledge of the bar and 
without a good faith basis for contravening the defense, is not itself sanctionable if the expiration 
of the statute of limitations does not extinguish the claim under the applicable law.”). But see In re 
Sekema, 523 B.R. 651, 654 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2015) (holding that filing a stale-debt claim is 
sanctionable under Rule 9011). 
 108. See, e.g., Casmatta, 2017 WL 3841739, at *9 (holding that it is inappropriate to impose 
sanctions under the court’s inherent or section 105 powers because the creditor’s conduct is not 
“entirely without color and motivated by improper purposes”). 
 109. See, e.g., Keeler v. PRA Receivables Mgmt., LLC (In re Keeler), 440 B.R. 354, 367 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009) (holding claims for violation of Pennsylvania consumer protection laws are 
preempted by bankruptcy law); In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225, 229–34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that claims under the Washington Consumer Protection Act for filing time-barred proofs 
of claim were preempted by the Bankruptcy Code and Rules); Pariseau v. Asset Acceptance, LLC 
(In re Pariseau), 395 B.R. 492, 494–95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that similar claims under 
the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade 
Practices Act are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code). 
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Bankruptcy Code or Rules, the only clear recourse for time-barred 
debt claims is case-by-case review and objection.110 
In most jurisdictions, the onus of this task falls squarely on 
chapter 13 trustees. Indeed, the Executive Director of the United States 
Trustee Program, which supervises chapter 13 trustees in most states, 
has made several statements underscoring his expectations that 
trustees will enhance their review of claims for statute-of-limitations 
defenses.111 Putting aside the logistical challenges this presents, it also 
may increase the costs of administering bankruptcy cases, which 
ultimately are borne by creditors who comply with bankruptcy law and 
procedure. Moreover, it is unclear that this result will curb the practice 
of filing time-barred debt claims, as debt buyers stand to profit if even 
a small percentage of the filed claims slip through the cracks. 
C.  Midland Funding’s Potential Impact on FDCPA Jurisprudence 
The Court’s ruling in Midland Funding might also drive the 
development of FDCPA jurisprudence in several distinct respects. 
First, while the Court did not decide the question before the Eleventh 
Circuit in Johnson v. Midland Funding—whether the Bankruptcy 
Code impliedly repeals the FDCPA—the Court nevertheless 
expressed concern about applying the FDCPA to bankruptcy matters. 
It emphasized that the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA have 
“different purposes and structural features,” and stated that permitting 
FDCPA claims in bankruptcy cases could upset the “‘delicate balance’ 
of debtor protections and obligations underlying the Bankruptcy 
Code.”112 
Lower courts might interpret the Court’s language as a soft 
rejection of the FDCPA’s application in bankruptcy. Yet, to do so 
 
 110. See, e.g., Keeler, 440 B.R. at 368–69 (“Absent some creditor impropriety in completing 
the proof of claim form constituting misconduct falling within the scope of section 105(a), or Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 9011, or within the scope of a non-bankruptcy law provision that is in harmony with 
the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor or trustee’s only redress for stale proofs of claim is the disallowance 
of the claim under section 502(b).”). 
 111. See Director Addresses the 52nd Annual Seminar of the National Association of Chapter 
13 Trustees, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: JUST. NEWS (July 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ust/ 
speeches-testimony/director-addresses-52nd-annual-seminar-national-association-chapter-13-
trustees (“Even though it increases the cost of administration, and those costs ultimately are borne 
by legitimate creditors, I am calling upon all chapter 13 trustees to identify stale debt claims and to 
object to stale debt claims that they uncover.”). 
 112. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1414–15 (2017). 
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would depart significantly from the Court’s existing jurisprudence on 
the intersection of federal statutes. 
The Supreme Court has long held that “[w]hen two statutes are 
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as 
effective.”113 The Court will find that one statute impliedly repeals the 
other only “where provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable 
conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier 
one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’”114 Most circuit courts 
that have considered the intersection of the FDCPA and the 
Bankruptcy Code have found that the two statutes can peacefully 
coexist. And, as I discuss elsewhere, the case law to the contrary has 
significant analytical flaws.115 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently explained that 
overlapping enforcement structures might represent a thoughtful 
component of legislative design, rather than an improper duplication 
of remedies. In Pom Wonderful, LLC v. Coca-Cola, Inc.,116 the Court 
held that competitor companies were entitled to bring private lawsuits 
asserting violations of the Lanham Act, even though the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetics Act purported to comprehensively regulate the subject 
of the dispute.117 The Court noted that it “is quite consistent with the 
congressional design to enact two different statutes, each with its own 
mechanisms to enhance the protection of competitors and 
consumers.”118 
The lessons of Pom Wonderful have direct application to the 
intersection of the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code. While the 
Bankruptcy Code provides a comprehensive process for the allowance 
and disallowance of claims, the FDCPA augments bankruptcy’s 
framework by providing additional consumer-debtor protections.119 
These protections operate to require creditors who qualify as “debt 
collectors” under the FDCPA to refrain from behavior that violates the 
 
 113. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 674 (2007) (quoting 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)); see also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–44 (2001) (same). 
 114. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003), amended by, 852 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Miss. 
2011). 
 115. See Bruce, supra note 2, at 5–7. 
 116. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
 117. Id. at 2238.  
 118. Id. at 2239. 
 119. See Bruce, supra note 2, at 10. 
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FDCPA. This clear and well-reasoned precedent should overshadow 
the Court’s more casual statements of concern in Midland Funding. 
And relatedly, litigants should not hesitate to invoke the FDCPA to 
challenge bankruptcy-related activities that violate the Act.120 
In Midland Funding, the Court also suggested that courts should 
apply a heightened standard to determine whether communications in 
bankruptcy are false, deceptive, or misleading under the FDCPA.121 
The Court stated that “to determine whether a statement is misleading 
normally ‘requires consideration of the legal sophistication of its 
audience.’”122 It characterized the audience in bankruptcy as including 
the chapter 13 trustee, “who must examine proofs of claim and, where 
appropriate, pose an objection.”123 This language appears to embrace 
a “competent trustee” standard, rather than the least sophisticated or 
unsophisticated consumer standard typically applied in FDCPA 
actions.124 At least one circuit court has applied a “competent 
attorney” standard to address whether proofs of claim filed in a 
bankruptcy case violate the FDCPA.125 But there, the debtor had been 
represented by counsel at all stages in the proceedings.126 The Court’s 
opinion in Midland Funding appears to take this one step further, 
applying a heightened standard in all bankruptcy cases, based on the 
fact that a trustee is always present.127 To the extent that lower courts 
interpret this ruling as such, it risks further reduction in the 
applicability of the FDCPA to bankruptcy matters. 
The potential effect of these statements pales in comparison to the 
likely impact of another recent Supreme Court case on the future of 
FDCPA litigation. In Henson v. Santander Consumer, USA, Inc.,128 
the Court held that Santander Bank was not a “debt collector” under 
the FDCPA because it had purchased the debt at issue as part of a 
portfolio and therefore was not engaged in the collection of “debts 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1409 (2017). 
 122. Id. at 1413. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Brief for Petitioner at 30, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) 
(No. 16-348) (arguing for a competent trustee standard). 
 125. See Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 
S. Ct. 2157 (2017). 
 126. Id. at 736. 
 127. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1420. 
 128. 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017). 
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owed . . . another.”129 This decision calls into serious question the 
FDCPA’s applicability to third-party purchasers of debt, like Midland 
Funding. It also may provide a roadmap for creditors to strategically 
avoid application of the FDCPA to their businesses.130 Yet, as I 
discuss elsewhere, Henson was decided on extremely narrow grounds 
and leaves open several alternative arguments for applying the Act to 
third-party debt buyers.131 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While Midland Funding has halted the flurry of FDCPA litigation 
proceeding through bankruptcy, district, and appellate courts 
throughout the nation, it may well encourage the continued filing of 
proofs of claim for time-barred debt. Despite the Court’s high praise 
of the competence of chapter 13 trustees, this decision places 
significant—and perhaps unattainable—regulatory burdens on their 
shoulders. 
The bankruptcy system has already begun the work of responding 
to these regulatory challenges through law and rule reform,132 targeted 
enforcement action, and non-FDCPA litigation strategies.133 With 
time and sustained attention to the problem, the bankruptcy system 
will adapt. Yet, the impact of the Court’s rulings in Midland Funding 
and Henson could significantly affect the future viability of FDCPA 
actions, both in consumer bankruptcy cases and beyond. 
 
 129. Id. at 1721–22, 1724. 
 130. See Kara Bruce, The Supreme Court’s 2017 FDCPA Rundown, BANKR. L. LTR., Sept. 
2017, at 1, 9–10. 
 131. Id. at 9. 
 132. See ABI Announces Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. (Mar. 13, 
2017), https://www.abi.org/newsroom/press-releases/abi-announces-commission-on-consumer-ba 
nkruptcy (discussing the American Bankruptcy Institute’s recent announcement of the formation 
of a Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy Issues). 
 133. See, e.g., Order Denying Atlas Acquisition LLC and Avischild’s Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Class Certification Claims, No 16-03235 (Bankr S.D. Tex. May 19, 2017). 
